Sunday, 15 November 2026

Y.B. Ashwathanarayan v. Union of India - The existence of proceeds of crime at the time of the trial of the offence under Section 3 of PMLA can be proved only if the scheduled offence is established in the prosecution of the scheduled offence. Therefore, even if the trial of the case under the PMLA proceeds, it cannot be finally decided unless the trial of scheduled offences concludes.

 HC Karnataka (20236.11.06) in Y.B. Ashwathanarayan v. Union of India [2026:KHC:61902, WP No. 18821 of 2024, C/W WP No. 8914 of 2024, WP No. 4630 of 2025 AND 2 OTHERS] held that; 

  • Even though the 2002 Act is a complete code in itself, it is only in respect of matters connected with offence of money laundering, and for that, existence of proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) PMLA is quintessential. Absent existence of proceeds of crime, as aforesaid, the authorities under the 2002 Act cannot step in or initiate any prosecution.

  • Hence, the existence of a scheduled offence is sine qua non for alleging the existence of proceeds of crime. A property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by a person as a result of the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence constitutes proceeds of crime.

  • The existence of proceeds of crime at the time of the trial of the offence under Section 3 of PMLA can be proved only if the scheduled offence is established in the prosecution of the scheduled offence. Therefore, even if the trial of the case under the PMLA proceeds, it cannot be finally decided unless the trial of scheduled offences concludes.

  • If there is no existence of the predicate offence, then in that event, proceedings under PMLA cannot exist; meaning even when the predicate offence is terminated in favour of the accused therein, the proceedings under PMLA cannot continue.

  • Filing of a private complaint by the ED is not contemplated under the PMLA. Allowing the ED to prefer a private complaint, when the other government authorities deem it inappropriate to initiate any proceedings against anybody, will amount to permitting the ED to act as a super cop and it goes against the philosophy of the Act which requires a predicate offence to be in existence for the ED to initiate proceedings as contemplated under the PMLA.

  • The scheme of the PMLA envisages that prosecution regarding the predicate offence has to be initiated by the respective prosecuting agency/third party, but not ED or Authorities constituted under the PMLA.

Excerpts of the order;

CAV ORDER

One Sri K.Y. Nanje Gowda, the petitioner in W.P. No.4630/2025, was the Chairman of the Land Grant Committee of Malur, Kolar District. There was an allegation made against him that he, in collusion with other Members of the Land Grant Committee, recommended grant of land measuring about 80 acres for about 38 persons and that the same was done by abusingtheir official position, in an illegal manner (hereinafter referred to as ‘Land Scam Case’). It culminated in filing of a private complaint by one Sri K.C.Rajanna bearing PCR No.15366/2022 before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore alleging commission of offences under Sections 468, 464, 465, 471, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Based on the aforementioned complaint, Crime No.489/2022 came to be registered. Thereafter, the said K.Y.Nanje Gowda was appointed as Chairman of Kolar and Chikkaballapur Milk Union Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘KOMUL’).


# 2. Based on the allegations in the Land Scam Case, treating the same as a predicate offence, the Enforcement Directorate (hereinafter referred to as ‘ED’) took up the matter for investigation and registered it as ECIR/BGZO/41/2023. In the process of investigation a search was conducted on the premises of several persons. While conducting the search, the ED came across certain materials, which, in its opinion, amounted to a scam pertaining to recruitments of employees to KOMUL (hereinafter referred to as ‘Job Scam Case’). 


# 3. Based on the alleged incriminating material pertaining to the Job Scam Case, summons were issued to one Sri Y.B.Ashwathanarayan. Aggrieved by the same, the said Sri Y.B.Ashwathanarayan has preferred W.P. No.8914/2024 with the following prayers: 

  • “(a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction and quash the ECIR NO.BGZO/41/2023/2849 registered on 30-11-2023 and the summons of which is dated 16.01.2024 produced as Annexure-A and all consequential actions including the show-cause notice issued in No.O.A.1132/24 dated 16.02.24 at Annexure-H issued by the respondent no.2, as illegal and ab initio void;

  • (b) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent to forebear the respondents from initiating any action under the provision of the PML Act;

  • (c) Pass any order or directions as this Hon’ble court deems fit in the circumstances of the case.” 


# 4. Thereafter, the ED filed O.A. No.1132/2024 under Section 17(4) of the Prevention of Money- Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PMLA’) before the Adjudicating Authority. The Adjudicating Authority has issued a show-cause notice in this regard to the concerned persons. Thereafter, the ED shared the information about the Job Scam Case with the jurisdictional police/authority, as contemplated under Section 66(2) of the PMLA.


# 5. However, a closure report was filed in Crime No.489/2022 (Land Scam Case) which was pending on the file of the jurisdictional Trial Court. In reply, the complainant therein filed a protest petition against the closure report. However, as the allegations were made against a public servant and it required government sanction for continuation of the Land Scam Case before the Trial Court and as the same was not obtained, the Trial Court dismissed the said case for non-prosecution.


# 6. In the meanwhile, the said Sri Y.B.Ashwathanarayan issued a reply to the show-cause notice issued by the Adjudicating Authority. However, the Adjudicating Authority confirmed the seizure in O.A. No.1132/2024 on 06.06.2024. Aggrieved by the same, the said order has been impugned by Sri Y.B.Ashwathanarayan by filing another writ petition (W.P. No.18821/2024) with the following prayers:

  • ”(a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction and quash  the order dated 06.06.2024 passed by the 2nd respondent, the adjudicating authority under the PMLA, 2002 passed in O.A.1132/2024 produced as Annexure-A in so far as the petitioner is concerned.

  • (b) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent to return back all the articles seized from the petitioners in so far as the petitioner is concerned.

  • (c) Pass any order or directions as this Hon’ble court deems fit in the circumstances of the case.” 


# 7. However, the jurisdictional police/authority did not deem it fit to act upon the information shared by the ED under Section 66(2) of PMLA, in respect of the Job Scam Case. Hence, the ED itself filed PCR No.32/2024 before the Trial Court to have the case referred to Lokayukta Police for investigation alleging offences under Sections 7, 11, 12 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 120B, 420, 464, 465, 468, 471 of IPC.


# 8. Aggrieved by the actions of the ED, Sri. K.Y.Nanje Gowda has preferred W.P. No.4630/2025 with the following prayers:

  • “a. To quash and set aside the actions of 1st Respondent in filing/submitting private complaint report under section 200 of the code of criminal procedure vide Annexure-A dated 11.09.2024 insofar as the petitioner is concerned.

  • b. To grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in order to meet the ends of justice.”


# 9. One Sri K.N.Gopala Murthy and one Sri Nagesh N., have preferred W.P. No.5168/2025 with the following prayers:

  • “(a) Set aside the Order dated 30.10.2024 in PCR No.32/2024 at Annexure-A, including the Complaint in PCR No.32/2024 on the file of the LXXXI Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge (Special Court Exclusively to deal with criminal Cases related to elected MPs and MLAs in the State of Karnataka) CCH.82, Bangalore at Annexure-B.

  • (b) Pass any other order or directions as this Hon’ble Court deems fit, in the interest of justice.”


# 10. One Dr.Raju Krishna C., has preferred W.P. No.22460/2025 with the following prayers:

  • “a. To quash and set aside the actions of 1st Respondent in filing/submitting private complaint report under section 200 of the code of criminal procedure vide Annexure-A dated 11.09.2024 PCR No.32/2024 pending before the Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore- (CCH.82) petitioner concern only.

  • b. To quash and set aside the order dated 30.10.2024 in PCR No.32/24 pending on Hon’ble Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, B’lore-(CCH.82) at Annexure-B taking cognizance of the complaint and calling for status report. 

  • c. To quash and set aside ECIR in BGZO/41/2023 dated 30.11.2023 registered by the 1st Respondent of which the Certified copy of Summons dated 19.01.2024 is produced at Annexure-E.

  • d. To grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in order to meet the ends of justice.”


# 11. In the aforementioned writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the actions of the ED in continuing the investigation, in respect of the Land Scam Case, even after the predicate offence being dismissed for non-prosecution and also the action of the ED in filing a private complaint, all by itself, against the petitioners in the Job Scam Case, when the concerned police/authority did not initiate any action based upon the information received under Section 66(2) of the PMLA. 


# 12. The case of the petitioners is that once a predicate offence is closed, either on merits or on technical grounds, the ED cannot continue investigation under the provisions of PMLA and when ED, while investigation into proceeds of crime under one offence, comes across any material which in its opinion, amounts to commission of an altogether different scheduled offence (predicate offence), the ED is only empowered to share the information with the relevant police/authority and it is not empowered to present a private complaint and take up the matter for investigation alleging that the accused therein are benefitted by the proceeds of crime.


# 13. The case of the ED is that once the investigation is taken up based on the existence of a predicate offence and the same gets closed on technical grounds and not on merits, still the ED is empowered to investigate into the offence of money laundering under the provisions of PMLA. It is also contended that when the concerned authority does not act upon the information received under Section 66(2) of the PMLA, then in that event, as any person is empowered to set into motion the criminal proceedings, the ED is empowered to maintain a private complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. On the said grounds, it is prayed that the writ petitions be dismissed.


# 14. The questions that arise under the instant petitions are:

  • (i) Can the Enforcement Directorate continue investigation into proceeds of crime under the provisions of the PMLA when the predicate offence is closed on technical ground such as for want of sanction from the concerned authority?

  • (ii) When the Enforcement Directorate, based on the material in its possession, is of the opinion that some other law in force is contravened, shares the information with the concerned agency for necessary action as per Section 66(2) of the PMLA and the said agency fails to initiate any prosecution against the accused, then in that event, can the Enforcement Directorate prefer a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C./223 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha  Sanhita, 2023 before the jurisdictional Magistrate and based on the said complaint can it initiate proceedings under the PMLA?


# 15. Section 3 of PMLA reads as under:

  • “3. Offence of money-laundering.— Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.

  • Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,—

  • (i) a person shall be guilty of offence of moneylaundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:—

(a) concealment; or

(b) possession; or 

(c) acquisition; or 

(d) use; or

(e) projecting as untainted property; or

(f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever;

  • (ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.”


# 16. Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA defines ‘proceeds of crime’ which reads as under:

  • “(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad;

  • Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;”


# 17. Thus, for an investigation or an inquiry to be made as to the existence of ‘proceeds of crime’ or laundering of the money obtained through proceeds of crime can be made only if there is pre-existence of a predicate offence and not otherwise. The Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Others Vs. Union of India and Others [(2023) 12 SCC 1], in paragraphs 148, 149 and 152, has held as under:

  • “148. The next question is: Whether the offence under Section 3 is a stand-alone offence? Indeed, it is dependent on the wrongful and illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Nevertheless, it is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes offence of money laundering. The property must qualify the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act.

  • 149. As observed earlier, all or whole of the crime property linked to scheduled offence need not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but all properties qualifying the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) will necessarily be crime properties. Indeed, in the event of acquittal of the person concerned or being absolved from allegation of criminal activity relating to scheduled offence, and if it is established in the court of law that the crime property in the case concerned has been rightfully owned and possessed by him, such a property by no stretch of imagination can be termed as crime property and ex consequenti proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) as it stands today. On the other hand, in the trial in connection with the scheduled offence, the court would be obliged to direct return of such property as belonging to him. It would be then paradoxical to still regard such property as proceeds of crime despite such adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction. It is well within the jurisdiction of the court concerned trying the scheduled offence to pronounce on that matter.

  • 152. Even though the 2002 Act is a complete code in itself, it is only in respect of matters connected with offence of money laundering, and for that, existence of proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) PMLA is quintessential. Absent existence of proceeds of crime, as aforesaid, the authorities under the 2002 Act cannot step in or initiate any prosecution.”


# 18. Further, the Apex Court in V. Senthil Balaji Vs. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement [2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626], in paragraph 21 has held as under:

  • “21. Hence, the existence of a scheduled offence is sine qua non for alleging the existence of proceeds of crime. A property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by a person as a result of the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence constitutes proceeds of crime. The existence of proceeds of crime at the time of the trial of the offence under Section 3 of PMLA can be proved only if the scheduled offence is established in the prosecution of the scheduled offence. Therefore, even if the trial of the case under the PMLA proceeds, it cannot be finally decided unless the trial of scheduled offences concludes. In the facts of the case, there is no possibility of the trial of the scheduled offences commencing in the near future. Therefore, we see no possibility of both trials concluding within a few years.”


# 19. Thus, the role of ED under PMLA commences only after a primary law enforcement agency registers a FIR or a formal criminal complaint regarding scheduled/predicate offence. The power of the ED is derivative and not original. It cannot initiate an investigation suo motu based on a standalone suspicion of money laundering. If there is no existence of the predicate offence, then in that event, proceedings under PMLA cannot exist; meaning even when the predicate offence is terminated in favour of the accused therein, the proceedings under PMLA cannot continue. 


# 20. In the instant case, admittedly, the private complaint filed in respect of the Land Scam Case has been closed for want of sanction from the competent authority. It has reached finality. Under the circumstances, the question of any person being convicted for the said offences does not arise. Thus, under the given facts and circumstances of the case, the action of the ED continuing the investigation or inquiry into existence of proceeds of crime derived from the scheduled offences alleged in the Land Scam Case cannot be sustained.


# 21. In respect of the ED preferring a private complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C/223 BNSS, when the concerned authorities did not act on the information provided by the ED under Section 66(2) of the PMLA and on the strength of the same, it has to be held that the ED is not empowered to do so for the following reasons:


(i) A perusal of Section 66(2) of PMLA points out that if, during the course of investigation, the ED comes across violations of other provisions of law, it is duty bound to intimate the concerned agency and not take up the investigation by itself. In law, where an act is to be done in a particular way, it must be done in that way and in no other way. Our Constitution envisages separation of powers between different organs of government. The reason being that one institution in the country does not become supreme so that it is in a position to abuse the powers conferred on it. Law recognizes the requirements of checks and balances. The ED is not a super cop to investigate anything and everything which comes into its notice. Section 48 of the PMLA envisages the authorities under the Act. Once appointed under the PMLA, they are bound by the restraints imposed on them by the PMLA. Section 66(2) of PMLA envisages that if the ED is of the opinion that it is having certain materials which constitute a scheduled offence, then in that event, the same should be forwarded to the concerned agency. The Act does not expressly empower the ED or the authorities under the PMLA to prefer a private complaint in respect of a scheduled offence and on the strength of it, thereafter, take up investigation against the accused therein under the provisions of PMLA. In fact, maintaining law and order is the responsibility of the State and not the Centre. It is the duty of the concerned agency to examine the same and to take a  decision whether to prosecute the matter further or not. The ED is not like any other person to file a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C./223 of BNSS. It has to exercise only those powers expressly conferred on it by the PMLA. Filing of a private complaint by the ED is not contemplated under the PMLA. Allowing the ED to prefer a private complaint, when the other government authorities deem it inappropriate to initiate any proceedings against anybody, will amount to permitting the ED to act as a super cop and it goes against the philosophy of the Act which requires a predicate offence to be in existence for the ED to initiate proceedings as contemplated under the PMLA. If the ED is permitted to file a private complaint, it will be in a position to file a private complaint against any person by itself and take up investigation against them. This is not contemplated under the provisions of the PMLA. In paragraphs 151 and 211 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the Apex Court has held as under:

  • “151. It is possible that in a given case after the discovery of huge volume of undisclosed property, the authorised officer may be advised to send information to the jurisdictional police [under Section 66(2) of the 2002 Act] for registration of a scheduled offence contemporaneously, including for further investigation in a pending case, if any. On receipt of such information, the jurisdictional police would be obliged to register the case by way of FIR if it is a cognizable offence or as a non-cognizable offence (NC case), as the case may be. If the offence so reported is a scheduled offence, only in that eventuality, the property recovered by the authorised officer would partake the colour of proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act, enabling him to take further action under the Act in that regard.

  • 211. This argument clearly overlooks the overall scheme of the 2002 Act. As noticed earlier, it is a comprehensive legislation, not limited to provide for prosecution of person involved in the offence of money laundering, but mainly intended to prevent money laundering activity and confiscate the proceeds of crime involved in money laundering. It also provides for prosecuting the person involved in such activity constituting offence of money laundering. In other words, this legislation is an amalgam of different facets including setting up of agencies and mechanisms for coordinating measures for combating money laundering. Chapter III is a provision to effectuate these purposes and objectives by attachment, adjudication and confiscation. The adjudication is done by the adjudicating authority to confirm the order of provisional attachment in respect of proceeds of crime involved in money laundering. For accomplishing that objective, the authorities appointed under Chapter VIII have been authorised to make inquiry into all matters by way of survey, searches and seizures of records and property. These provisions in no way invest power in the authorities referred to in Chapter VIII of the 2002 Act to maintain law and order or for that matter, purely investigating into a criminal offence.”


The decision of the Apex Court in Mukesh Singh Vs. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) [ (2020)10 SCC 120] is not applicable to the present case as the same pertains to the NDPS Act and not the PMLA.


(ii) Examining the instant case itself, the jurisdictional police have filed a ‘B’ Report in the Land Scam Case. Thereafter, the sanctioning authority has not issued necessary sanction to prosecute the alleged accused therein. If we were to accept the contention of the ED in the instant case, it would amount to concluding that the jurisdictional police and the sanctioning authority are guilty of dereliction of their respective duties and the ED alone is correct. Similarly, in Job Scam Case, it amounts to presuming the Lokayukta Police/agency, who have not proceeded against the accused by not initiating any criminal proceedings based on the information provided by the ED, are guilty of dereliction of their respective duties and putting the ED on a higher pedestal, which is not contemplated in law. The scheme of the PMLA envisages that prosecution regarding the predicate offence has to be initiated by the respective prosecuting agency/third party, but not ED or Authorities constituted under the PMLA.


# 22. For the aforementioned reasons, the petitions deserve to be allowed. Hence, the following: 

ORDER

  • (i) All the petitions are allowed.

  • (ii) The impugned order dated 06.06.2024 passed by respondent No.2-Adjudicating Authority in O.A. No.1132/2024, insofar as it relates to the petitioner in W.P. No.18821/2024, is hereby quashed.

  • (iii) The respondents are directed to return the articles seized, if any, from the petitioner in W.P. No.18821/2024.

  • (iv) The ECIR No.BGZO/41/2023/2849 dated 30.11.2023, the summons issued pursuant thereto and the consequential proceedings including the show-cause notice dated 16.02.2024 in O.A. No.1132/2024, impugned in W.P.8914/2024 and W.P. No.22460/2025, are hereby quashed insofar as it relates to the petitioners therein are concerned.

  • (v) Proceedings in PCR No.32/2024 pending before the Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-82) stands quashed insofar as it relates to the petitioner in W.P. No.22460/2025, W.P.No.4630/2025 and W.P. No.5168/2025.

  • (vi) The ECIR No.BGZO/41/2023/2849 dated 30.11.2023 and the consequential summons dated 09.01.2024 impugned in W.P. No.22460/2025 are hereby quashed.

  • (vii) All pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.

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Thursday, 2 July 2026

Value Wise Consultancy Private Limited Vs. The Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement & Ors. - The writing is on the wall for the appellant: whether to attach or not to attach the properties of a corporate debtor is for the Enforcement Directorate to decide, and where there has been any such attachment by the ED, the adjudicatory mechanism created under the PMLA alone will have jurisdiction to deal with any challenge to it.

 NCLAT (2026.06.30) in Value Wise Consultancy Private Limited Vs. The Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement & Ors. [Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1226 and 1227 of 2022] held that;

  • This in turn leads to a concomitant conclusion that, if the purpose behind Sec.14 is to freeze the existing liability of the corporate debtor as on the date when it is admitted to CIRP as part of the legislative strategy to preserve the status quo for a convenient resolution of insolvency of the CD, then operation of Sec.14 must be limited to those litigations and proceedings, both pending and prospective, either civil or criminal, which hold the likelihood of adding on to the existing debt liability of the corporate debtor and not others.

  • Needless to state that those crimes which spring from penal statutes of public law nature, with no prospect of adding to the debt-liability of civil nature of the CD, cannot be allowed to be impacted by the moratorium, even if they affect the net asset of the CD available for CIRP or liquidation.

  • Supreme Court in Embassy Property Developments Private Limited Vs State of Karnataka and Others [(2020)13 SCC 308], where it was held that the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority is limited by the extent to which it is required to be exercised for the purposes of working of the IBC and no more. After all, both IBC and the PMLA, are legislations of the Parliament and as shown earlier, they operate in different domains with different objectives to achieve, and do not overlap in their respective operations.

  • Indeed, the IBBI has also taken note of the issue on jurisdiction, and hence in paragraph 2 of its Circular No. IBBI/CIRP/87/2025, dated 04th November, 2025, it has advised the resolution professionals that “where the assets of the corporate debtor are attached by the ED under the provisions under PMLA, the Insolvency Professional may file an application before the Special Court under Sections 8(7) or 8(8) of the PMLA for restitution of such assets”. Necessarily, the tribunals constituted under the IBC are not the forums which can entertain any plea against the ED.

  • The writing is on the wall for the appellant: whether to attach or not to attach the properties of a corporate debtor is for the Enforcement Directorate to decide, and where there has been any such attachment by the ED, the adjudicatory mechanism created under the PMLA alone will have jurisdiction to deal with any challenge to it.

Blogger’s Comments; All said and done, the principal objectives of attachment & confiscation of tainted property in PMLA is that a person/company is not able to enjoy the proceeds of crime. Under IBC, as soon as the application under section 7, 9 or 10 is accepted, the control of the company is divested from its promoters/directors/existing management & the promoters/directors are prevented from taking back the control of the company (Section 29A & section 32A) either during insolvency proceedings or during liquidation process, thus fulfilling the principal objectives of PMLA.


Rather, attachment of company’s property (particularly liquid assets i.e. bank accounts etc.) under the provisions of PMLA, during insolvency/liquidation proceedings frustrate the principal objectives of the IBC, to put the assets of insolvent companies in the beneficial use of the society. In contrast due  to protracted proceedings in PMLA the value of the assets gets diminished, which ultimately is the loss of the society.


In my view, the IBC may provide for deemed suspension of PMLA attachment orders during the CIRP & Liquidation process, for smooth conduct of CIRP & Liquidation process.


Excerpts of the Order; 

# 1. The present set of twin appeals are preferred by the Liquidator of M/s Siddhi Vinayak Logistics Ltd., challenging the Common Order dated 19.07.2022 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT, Ahmedabad) dismissing his applications in IA No. 453 of 2019 and IA No. 773 of 2021 in CP (IB) No. 89 of 2017.


# 2. To provide a brief overview of this case, the issue involved in these appeals relates to the authority of the Enforcement Directorate to withdraw the amount from a bank account of the CD which the former had attached earlier prior to the commencement of CIRP of the CD, but transferred it during the subsistence of moratorium. Liquidator contends that this sum must be part of the liquidation asset of the CD, but it was negated by the Adjudicating Authority principally on the ground of perceived lack of jurisdiction in the Adjudicating Authority.


Facts:

# 3. The genesis of the dispute lies in the investigation which the Directorate of Enforcement has commenced pursuant to the FIRs registered againstthe Corporate Debtor, alleging bank-fraud and diversion of loan funds by the Corporate Debtor and its promoters. In furtherance thereof, vide communications dated 24.04.2017 the ED issued a notice under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA, for short) to various debtors/customers of the Corporate Debtor and directed them not to transact with or release monies to the Corporate Debtor. In short, this is the setting:

a) On 08.06.2017, ED issued an Order of provisional attachment, attaching movable and immovable assets of the CD and related entities/persons.

b) On 24.10.2017, this provisional order of attachment was confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority constituted under the PMLA in terms of Sec.8(4) of the said Act.

c) In between, i.e., after the provisional order of attachment and the subsequent order of confirmation of the said Order, on 12.09.2017, the CD was drawn into CIRP pursuant to an Order of the Adjudicating Authority under the IBC in CP (IB) No. 89 of 2017. Consequently, moratorium under Sec. 14 of the IBC came into operation. In effect, the second mentioned Order confirming provisional attachment of the CD’s assets was passed during the moratorium.

d) Subsequently, on 12.12.2018, the Appellate Tribunal under the PMLA, set aside the earlier order of attachment. The Enforcement Directorate promptly challenged this before the Bombay High Court and it is pending. It may however, be mentioned that the High Court did not stay the operation of the Order of the Appellate Tribunal under the PMLA.

e) While things stood thus, on 02.08.2018, during the subsistence of the moratorium of the CD, the Enforcement Directorate withdrew a sum of ₹.2,29,10,131.06 from the account of the corporate debtor with M/s ICICI Bank.

f) The CIRP against the CD failed and on 19.11.2018 its liquidation was ordered.

g) When the liquidation process was underway, on 18.06.2019, the Enforcement Directorate issued a fresh order of Provisional Attachment of 6,170 vehicles belonging to the Corporate Debtor. This Order of attachment came to be partially confirmed vide its order dated 03.12.2019, when the Adjudicating Authority under the PMLA approved the attachment of only 1,344 vehicles and not the remaining 4,826 vehicles which were already traced by the

Liquidator and have not been taken possession of.


# 4. The Liquidator would now file two applications under Sec.60(5) of the IBC, the details whereof are:

a) I.A No. 453 of 2019, inter alia, for the withdrawal of the provisional orders of attachment dated 08.06.2017 and 18.06.2019 and for remittance/refund of ₹2.29 crores withdrawn by the ED from the account of the Corporate Debtor.

b) I.A No. 773 of 2021, for quashing and setting aside the communications of the ED, dated 24.04.2017 issued under Sec.50 of the PMLA and consequential directions to the debtors/customers of the Corporate Debtor, including Ashok Leyland Ltd., Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd., Sonalika International Tractors Ltd. and Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage Pvt. Ltd. to release the admitted outstanding dues payable to the Corporate Debtor. The ground on which the liquidator rested his plea is that the actions of ED were in direct violation of the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC and that they had the effect of frustrating CIRP/liquidation by depriving the Corporate Debtor of its receivables and assets.


# 5. The ED opposed these applications and contended that the proceeding under the PMLA are independent criminal proceedings relating to “proceeds of crime”, that the PMLA is a special statute with overriding effect on the IBC and that the tribunals constituted under the IBC lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the attachment proceedings or actions undertaken under the PMLA. 


# 6. The defence of the ED prevailed with the Adjudicating Authority and accordingly, both applications of the liquidator came to be dismissed vide the common order with a direction to the liquidator to approach the appropriate forum, which is now under challenge.


Arguments

# 7. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended:

a) that the Adjudicating Authority committed a manifest error in declining jurisdiction under Section 60(5) of the IBC, despite the dispute arising directly out of the alleged violation of the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the Code.

b) that the present proceedings do not require adjudication upon the legality or validity of proceedings under the PMLA but are confined only to the issue whether the Directorate of Enforcement could lawfully withdraw monies from the account of the Corporate Debtor during the subsistence of the moratorium.

c) that once the CIRP commences, all assets and receivables of the Corporate Debtor will be under the statutory protection of Section 14 and consequently no authority could continue coercive action against the assets of the Corporate Debtor. The withdrawal of ₹.2,29,10,131.06 from the bank account of the Corporate Debtor during the currency of the moratorium was ex facie contrary to Section 14(1)(a) of the Code and constituted unlawful depletion of the insolvency estate. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Mohanraj and Sundaresh Bhatt [(2021) SCC 258] has held that while statutory authorities may continue adjudicatory proceedings, coercive recovery or enforcement actions in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the Code are impermissible in law, but the impugned Order however, overlooked both the effect of Sec.14 and also the ratio in Mohanraj case.

d) on facts, the Adjudicating Authority has failed to appreciate that vide its order dated 12.12.2018, the Appellate Tribunal under the PMLA has set aside the earlier Order of attachment made under Sec.8(5) of the said Act. And, the Bombay High Court before which the Enforcement Directorate has challenged the aforesaid order of the appellate authority, has not stayed the operation of the said order either. Therefore, in the absence of any subsisting attachment, the Respondent could not continue to retain the monies withdrawn during the moratorium.

e) that the subsequent coercive actions initiated by the ED were barred on principles analogous to res judicata, since the basis of the proceedings had already been considered by the Appellate Tribunal under the PMLA.

f) so far as that the communications issued under Section 50 of the PMLA had the effect of preventing debtors/customers of the Corporate Debtor from releasing admitted dues payable to the Corporate Debtor and thereby frustrated the CIRP/liquidation process.

g) that despite repeated requests and representations made by the Liquidator, the Respondent failed to withdraw the restraint  communications issued to the debtors/customers of the Corporate Debtor.

h) the conduct of the Respondent defeated the object of the IBC by depriving the Corporate Debtor of its receivables and diminishing the value of the insolvency estate;

i) At any rate, the appellant has not sought adjudication upon attachment proceedings under the PMLA but only enforcement of the statutory consequences flowing from Section 14 of the IBC, which falls within the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority.


# 8. Learned Counsel for the Respondent Contended:

a) that the proceedings initiated by the Directorate of Enforcement arose out of serious allegations of bank fraud, forgery, criminal conspiracy and diversion of loan funds involving an amount exceeding ₹.1600 crores and therefore constituted proceedings relating to “proceeds of crime” under the PMLA. Hence, the Corporate Debtor and its promoters were accused in multiple FIRs registered by the CBI concerning fraudulently availing credit facilities and diversion of fund from multiple banks which justify invoking the PMLA. And, the investigation under the PMLA revealed generation, layering and integration of proceeds of crime through various entities controlled by the promoters of the Corporate Debtor and therefore the attached properties represented tainted assets liable for attachment and confiscation under the PMLA.

b) that the Provisional Attachment Order dated 08.06.2017 was issued prior to commencement of CIRP and was subsequently confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority under the PMLA on 24.10.2017. And, the withdrawal of ₹2,29,10,131.06 on 02.08.2018 was effected pursuant to powers available under the PMLA in respect of attached properties and therefore could not be treated as an unlawful recovery action. 

c) that proceedings under the PMLA are independent criminal proceedings relating to proceeds of crime and operate in a completely distinct field from insolvency proceedings under the IBC.

d) Neither the Adjudicating Authority nor this Appellate Tribunal possesses jurisdiction to interfere with attachment proceedings initiated under the PMLA or with actions taken by authorities constituted thereunder. Section 60(5) of the IBC at no time be interpreted as conferring an all-pervasive jurisdiction upon the NCLT/NCLAT to examine decisions taken by statutory authorities exercised in public law. Reliance was placed on the ratio in Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. Vs State of Karnatka & Others [2019 SCC OnLine SC 1542], Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Amit Gupta & Ors., [(2021) 7 SCC 209].

e) Not only the IBC and the tribunals constituted thereunder have different purposes to achieve from that which is intended by IBC, by no stretch of interpretation can the Enforcement Directorate be termed as a creditor within the meaning of Sec.5(20) and (21) of the IBC for the tribunals to invoke its jurisdiction in matters concerning the working of PMLA. At any rate, Section 14 of the IBC has no application to criminal proceedings or penal actions having the character of proceedings concerning proceeds of crime and therefore attachment proceedings under the PMLA remain unaffected by moratorium. Reliance was placed on Embassy Property Developers case, Directorate of Enforcement Delhi V. Axis Bank [2019 SCC Online Delhi 7854], Kiran Shah, R.P. of KSL Industries Vs Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata, [Com. Appeal (AT)(Ins) 817 of 2021].

f) Section 41 of the PMLA expressly bars jurisdiction of civil courts and other authorities in matters falling within the competence of authorities constituted under the PMLA.


Discussion & Decision

# 9. The facts and the arguments being what they are (as stated above), the critical aspect of the controversy relates to the legality of attaching the assets of the corporate debtor by the Enforcement Directorate either during the moratorium clamped under Sec.14 of the Code, or during liquidation process in the context of Sec.33(5) thereof. In short, the dispute is not appellant Vs the Enforcement Directorate, but IBC Vs PMLA, when both the legislations are in action. 


# 10. The facts in controversy give rise to three issues:

  • a) Whether the Order of attachment and physical removal of certain assets of the CD by the Enforcement Directorate when the CD was under moratorium is legally sustainable?

  • b) whether in view of the appellate authority constituted under the PMLA vacating the Order of attachment whose correctness though being challenged before the High Court, yet inasmuch as the High Court has not stayed the operation of the Order of the appellate authority, is it justifiable for the Enforcement Directorate to continue to retain the amounts of the CD that it has taken possession of?

  • c) The last issue is the sustainability of the notice issued by the Enforcement Directorate under Sec.50 of the PMLA to the debtors of the corporate debtor directing them not to make payments to the CD.


# 11. It requires to be reminded with a strong dose of emphasis that the PMLA, 2002, was enacted to fulfill India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations, and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. These international initiatives required the countries to criminalize money laundering, confiscate proceeds of crime, and strengthen international cooperation. The genesis of PMLA is rooted here with an intent to prevent money laundering and to combat organized economic terrorism besides actual terrorist- financing, and to protect the integrity of our financial system. Set in the context, the attachment of proceeds of crime or relatable to it under the PMLA is in aid of its eventual confiscation, which, it may be said, is a legislative structure for tracking and hunting such ill-gotten assets. The intent is evident: there shall be no tolerance, no premium for engaging in the crime which the Parliament is keen to forbid. If this aspect of PMLA is placed alongside an analysis of the objective of the IBC, it is gatherable that notwithstanding the laudability of the objective that provides centrifugality to the functioning of the Code, it still remains only as a statute for resolving the insolvency situation of a debtridden company - just one company. If this is unlayered more, it exposes the reality of a conflict between the interest of few creditors of a company in CIRP versus the national interest. While the former is compromisable, which, at any rate happens through the haircuts imposed during the distribution of the proceeds of a successful CIRP, or liquidation, which every creditor of a CD knows, accepts, and is prepared for, national interest at all times remains uncompromisable.


# 12. This apart, the PMLA in its working neither differentiates nor discriminates the companies that are drawn into a CIRP and those which are considered financially safe by its creditors. It must be emphasised that Parliament did not legislate IBC with an intent to create a holy Ganges out of the IBC to wash the corporate debtor of its sin of criminality under the PMLA, or as a mechanism for legitimizing any ill-gotten wealth of the CD. There is nothing in the code, that enables accommodating the wealth which is sourced by and out of a crime, in the resolution or liquidation process of a corporate debtor. The legislative intent behind the scheme of IBC only aims to deal with the issue of corporate insolvency, either in a CIRP or in

a liquidation process, and to pay off the creditors of the corporate debtor through the sale proceeds of the legitimate assets of the corporate debtor either as a going concern or as liquidated assets, as the case may be, and not out of the ill-gotten wealth of the CD. Otherwise, and as indicated earlier, IBC would unwittingly become a camouflage, a shield, to save the ill-gotten wealth of the corporate debtor and create a classification within the non-discriminatory character of the PMLA. Set on this plane, if the operational space of Sec.14 of the Code during the CIRP, or Sec.33(5) during liquidation, is tested, it becomes evident that these provisions legislatively intended to gyrate around the legitimately acquired assets of the corporate debtor and not with those that fall within the shadow of crime under the PMLA. This in turn leads to a concomitant conclusion that, if the purpose behind Sec.14 is to freeze the existing liability of the corporate debtor as on the date when it is admitted to CIRP as part of the legislative strategy to preserve the status quo for a convenient resolution

of insolvency of the CD, then operation of Sec.14 must be limited to those litigations and proceedings, both pending and prospective, either civil or criminal, which hold the likelihood of adding on to the existing debt liability of the corporate debtor and not others. Needless to state that those crimes which spring from penal statutes of public law nature, with no prospect of adding to the debt-liability of civil nature of the CD, cannot be allowed to be impacted by the moratorium, even if they affect the net asset of the CD available for CIRP or liquidation. See: Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate Vs Axis Bank [2019 SCC OnLine Delhi 7854], Varrsana Ispat Ltd., through its RP Vs Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement [Comp.Appeal (AT) 493 of 2018] confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C.A.(s) 5546 of 2019, and relied on by this tribunal in Kiran Shah, R.P. of KSL Industries Vs Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata, [Com. Appeal (AT)(Ins) 817 of 2021] and Ashok Kumar Sarawagi, RP of Kohinoor Steel Private Ltd., Vs Enforcement Directorate & another [Com.Appeal (AT)(Ins) No:411 of 2022].


# 13. The appellant however, placed considerable reliance in the authority of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Mohan Raj & Others Vs Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd., [(2021)6 SCC 258], where the Court has held that a proceeding under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act would fall within Sec.14 of the Act, but the correctness of the same is now doubted by another bench of the Supreme Court recently in Dineshchand Surana Vs UCO Bank, [(2026) ibclaw.in 402 SC], and the issue has now been referred to a larger bench. 


# 14. It now on the above plane, the controversy on jurisdiction of the tribunals constituted under the IBC to travel into the working of other statutes, more particularly the PMLA, to be tested. This is no more res integra as the issue now stands settled in the celebrated authority of the Supreme Court in Embassy Property Developments Private Limited Vs State of Karnataka and Others [(2020)13 SCC 308], where it was held that the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority is limited by the extent to which it is required to be exercised for the purposes of working of the IBC and no more. After all, both IBC and the PMLA, are legislations of the Parliament and as shown earlier, they operate in different domains with different objectives to achieve, and do not overlap in their respective operations. Indeed, the IBBI has also taken note of the issue on jurisdiction, and hence in paragraph 2 of its Circular No. IBBI/CIRP/87/2025, dated 04th November, 2025, it has advised the resolution professionals that “where the assets of the corporate debtor are attached by the ED under the provisions under PMLA, the Insolvency Professional may file an application before the Special Court under Sections 8(7) or 8(8) of the PMLA for restitution of such assets”. Necessarily, the tribunals constituted under the IBC are not the forums which can entertain any plea against the ED.


# 15. In the course of arguments, Sec.32A(2) of the Code was also referred to, but for the present we do not consider a need to discuss it, since Sec.32(A) operates only where there is a successful insolvency resolution process. 


# 16. The writing is on the wall for the appellant: whether to attach or not to attach the properties of a corporate debtor is for the Enforcement Directorate to decide, and where there has been any such attachment by the ED, the adjudicatory mechanism created under the PMLA alone will have jurisdiction to deal with any challenge to it. This will also include any notice issued under Sec.50 of the PMLA. So far as those assets which have been relieved by the appellate authority under the PMLA goes, even though no order of stay has been passed by the Bombay High Court, the fact remains that the correctness of the Order of the appellate authority is being tested there, which again fall within the framework for working the adjudicatory process under the PMLA, the appellant may have to approach the High Court.


# 17. To conclude, we find no merit in the appeals and dismiss the same as we concur with the conclusion of the Adjudicating Authority. No costs. Pending I.A.s, if any, also stand disposed of.

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